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Abstract. The experimental setup of the self-referential quantum measure-
ment, jovially known as the ”quantum suicide” or the ”quantum Russian
roulette” is analyzed from the point of view of the Principal Principle of
David Lewis. It is shown that the apparent violation of this principle—
relating objective probabilities and subjective chance—in this type of thought
experiment is just an illusion due to the usage of some terms and concepts
ill-defined in the quantum context. We conclude that even in the case that
Everett’s (or some other ”no-collapse”) theory is a correct description of
reality, we can coherently believe in equating subjective credence with ob-
jective chance in quantum-mechanical experiments. This is in agreement
with results of the research on personal identity in the quantum context by
Parfit and Tappenden.
1 Introduction: Principal Principle in the multi-
verse
The so-called Principal Principle (henceforth PP) introduced by David Lewis
(1986) suggests, roughly, that our credence in a proposition A, given all ad-
missible evidence, should equate with one’s best estimate of the objective
chance that A will come true. Precisely, Cr(A, XE) = x, where A is a propo-
sition, X is the proposition that the chance of A being true is x, x is a real
number between 0 and 1, E is any “admissible” evidence, and Cr(.) is a rea-
sonable credence function. From this general formulation we conclude that
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if Cr(XE) = 1 then Cr(A) = x. Applied to physical experiments, PP tells
us that we should believe one of the possible outcomes of an experiment,
say Ai, with credence
Cr(Ai) = pi, (1)
where pi is the physical chance of this outcome, provided we possess only
admissible information about the experiment. This is especially convenient
for experiments in quantum mechanics, like the stock example of radioactive
decay of a heavy nucleus, since the underlying physical mechanism is usually
thought of as being irreducibly stochastic; thus, the possibility of some
inadmissible information slipping in unnoticed is remote. (Refinements of
the PP, criteria of admissibility, and suggested alternative chance-credence
relations often appear in the literature, but we shall not consider them
here.) Usually, PP is just an embodiment of our common sense intuitions;
we simply follow (1) in everyday life as well as in physics, with routine
success. But, PP can be—at least apparently—violated if the so-called “no-
collapse” versions of quantum mechanics (e.g. Everett 1957; Deutsch 1985;
Tegmark 1998) turn out to be correct. Here is the recipe.
Let Hugh, an experimental physicist, prepare a simple coherent state of,
say, spin z-projection of a fermion:
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|↑〉+ |↓〉) , (2)
(any other quantum superposition will do equally well). The spin measuring
device is coupled to a revolver in such way that, after Hugh or anybody
else pulls the trigger, spin measurement will take place. The measured
eigenstate |↓〉 will result in firing the revolver, and the measured |↑〉 will
result in a harmless “click”. One important proviso is that the duration of
measurement (including the reaction time of the revolver) should be short
in comparison to any timescale characterizing human perception. If the
revolver is aimed at any target other than Hugh himself, he expects to
see a seemingly random outcome of each individual measurement: either
“bang” or “click” with the probability of a coin toss. If we suppose that
measurements are taken in series of n consecutive measurements (pullings of
the trigger), probability of achieving any individual combination of “bangs”
and “clicks” is given by the simplest binomial distribution; in particular,
the probability of obtaining ”click” n consecutive times is p(n ↑) = 0.5n.
There is no observed—or observable—difference between collapse and “no-
collapse” quantum theories at this point.1
1Metaphysically, Hugh is aware that the complete description is certainly different in
these two cases; notably, on the “no-collapse” quantum mechanics he believes in, both
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Things take a strange turn when Hugh decides—perhaps upon advice
of some respectable quantum theorists—to point the revolver to his own
head.2 The state of the entire system, after the first measurement, now
evolved from (2) to (symbolically)
Uˆ |ψ〉 ⊗ |experimenter〉 = Uˆ 1√
2




(|↑〉 ⊗ |”click”〉+ |↓〉 ⊗ |”dead”〉). (4)
It is almost self-evident that no probability (objective or otherwise) makes
sense for Hugh in his |”dead”〉 state (but see Papineau 2003 and comments
below). Since we have exactly one observer before and after the measure-
ment, and since the decoherence of branches—the two terms in parenthesis
in (3)—occurred much faster than our experimenter could notice, we may be
certain that he will observe spin ”up”, and therefore hear a harmless ”click”.
And the same could be repeated arbitrarily often! Notice that only physical
collapse—as in the ”orthodox” Copenhagen interpretation or the dynamical
reduction theories—is actually harmful from Hugh’s point of view. Since
in the ”no-collapse” view there is no actual collapse, just fast decoherence
between the branches, Hugh will find himself in the strange situation of im-
possibility of committing suicide, although the revolver is loaded and fully
functional! This is different from the ”outsider” view of, say, assistant in
the experiment, who will perceive the bloody deed after at most several
repetitions of the experiment (being in one of the decohered branches of
the universal wavefunction and being able to perceive the measured spin
“down”).
This is, of course, the “quantum suicide” experiment of Squires (1986),
Moravec (1988), Zeh (1992), Price (1996) and Tegmark (1998)—it seems
that many people have arrived independently atthe same idea, although
the late Euan Squires seems to be the first who wrote about it,3 and only
with Tegmark’s (1998) paper it received proper attention. Recently, it has
attracted a lot of attention in philosophical circles either (Lewis 2000, 2004;
Papineau 2003, 2004; Tappenden 2004). Of course, different variations of
the experimental setup are possible. It can be even cast in Moravec’s form
a “click” and a “bang” will be realized in each measurement, being the two components
of the unbreakable superposition, but he will perceive only one of them due to the rapid
environmental decoherence. The decoherence timescale is, even for quite isolated fermion
spins, still much shorter than the human perception timescale.
2Hence the name of “quantum Russian roulette” or “quantum suicide”.
3Although a SF story of John Gribbin preceded it for about a year: ”The Dooms-
day Device”, published in Analog, January 22, 1985 (personal communications with H.
Moravec and J. Gribbin).
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of the “collective” quantum suicide (quantum genocide?), i.e. running a
potentially catastrophic experiment on the new super-duper accelerator. In
all these cases one thing is clear: while the objective chance of measuring
spin ”up” in Hugh’s single measurement is, of course, p↑ = 0.5, subjective
probability of the same (”surviving”) outcome is Cr(↑) = 1. Obviously,
this violates (1) and Hugh finds PP misleading. Moreover, by repeating
the measurement, our experimenter can obtain arbitrary large PP violation
(and, simultaneously, obtain an arbitrarily large degree of confidence in the
validity of the no-collapse theory).
One rather obvious way out of the difficulty is to contest the usual
death-defying conclusion of the quantum suicide thought experiment. This
has been recently argued in extenso, though with somewhat different mo-
tivation, by Papineau (2003, 2004). In reply to a paper by Peter J. Lewis
(2000), he proposes effectively assigning a (negative) utility value to Hugh’s
|”dead”〉 state. Without going into details of the argument (soon diverted
to the issue of life-staking degree of belief in physical theories which, though
of paramount general importance, is irrelevant for our purposes here), we
notice at least its rather ad hoc nature. Further, it has been, in our view,
strongly and correctly criticized by Tappenden (2004) whose arguments, in
conjunction with the original Lewis (2000) claim, vindicate the legitimacy
of the conventional quantum suicide on most versions of Everettian theo-
ries. Of course, Peter J. Lewis and Tappenden have quite different views on
whether this bodes well or not for such theories, but it is also less relevant
from our point of view. It would, of course, be more important and interest-
ing to discuss any issues related to the quantum multiverse if a no-collapse
theory turns out to be true, perhaps by some radical new experiment like
the one proposed by Deutsch (1985); but even if things turn otherwise, the
general puzzle seems interesting enough.
2 Analysis
Should we reject PP because it seems apparently violated in the quantum
suicide experiment? Not really. After all, as with all principles, PP should
be understood primarily as a ”guideline” in our probabilistic considerations.
It perceives objective chances as concise, informative summaries of patterns
of local empirical facts. The violation described above arises because con-
ventional guidelines are unavoidably geared toward experiments performed
objectively, without real participation of an individual observer. Subjec-
tively defined outcomes are, naturally, somewhat more difficult to analyze
in the physical context; we shall show below how we ought to actually an-
alyze various positions in respect to the issue of personal identity in the
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no-collapse theories, in order to explain how PP remains valid. This seems
like another instance of the necessity of taking into account the “anthropic
bias” (cf. Bostrom 2002), necessarily limiting the entire space of prima facie
possible experimental outcomes. Whenever it is possible to infer the out-
come of the chance experiment with certainty, the value of objective chance
becomes irrelevant. What is so striking here is that “no-collapse” quantum
theories give us a perfectly scientific opportunity to reach such knowledge
at the fundamental level, without recourse to proverbial “crystal balls” and
other non-physical devices used in the literature to exemplify inadmissible
evidence (e.g. Vranas 1998). The simple insight which the experimenter (if
knowledgeable about the “no-collapse” theories, as Hugh certainly is!) pos-
sesses about the outcome of the experiment entails that he will not believe
the PP-favored value of 50% chance.
Let us consider now what exactly the controversial proposition is in the
above-described experiment. Obviously, in conjecturing that PP is violated,
our proposition has been the following:
A: Hugh will survive the quantum suicide experiment.
Seemingly, this proposition violates PP, as stated above. However, this
is an illusion, stemming from uncritical use of our conventional notions
of existence and survival in the inappropriate context of the no-collapse
theories. Spin measurement causes the universal wavefunction to “branch”;
what happens to Hugh during the branching process? The answer to this
question depends on our theories of personal identity in the multiverse, the
issue recently clearly investigated by Tappenden (2000; see also Parfit 1984).
We have stated the necessity of timescales for the apparatus and the gun to
be restricted; however, we can always find a small temporal interval between
the spin measurement and the actual firing/clicking of the gun, and pose
our question in that time interval. There are several at least superficially
plausible answers, notably: (i) Hugh exists in all branches, (ii) Hugh exists
in none of the branches, and (iii) Hugh exists in some of the branches, but
not in others. Let us analyze these cases from the point of view of chances in
the quantum suicide experiment, and neglecting other problematic features
some of these options may have for other reasons.4
If Hugh exists in all branches, then we may be certain that he will
4For instance, the difficulties can consist in the implied account of the tensed discourse.
If Hugh survives in one wavefunction branch and not in the other (case i.), doesn’t that
make it the case that ”Hugh will survive the quantum suicide experiment” and ”Hugh
will not survive the quantum suicide experiment” are both true, while their conjunction
”Hugh will survive the quantum suicide experiment and he will not survive the quantum
suicide experiment” is false?
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survive the experiment, and it is with this case in mind that Squires and
others have actually suggested the quantum suicide thought experiment in
the first place. This is in accordance with the idea of reductionism of Parfit
or person-reductionism of Tappenden, i.e.
the idea that there is no more to the identity of a person over
time than that there is a series of personal states linked by some
relation, where personal states are identified in a way which does
not require their attribution to a person. A personal state can be
thought of as a group of mental characteristics which all belong
to what we would normally think of as history of a single waking
human body over a short period of time. The duration of this
period is the amount of time we think of as being the present
moment, the minimal time-frame in which we have experiences;
it is often called the specious present. ... We can think of the
duration of a typical personal state as being something around
a fifth of a second.5
What sense do we make of the proposition A here? It is reasonable to
understand it as a claim that Hugh survives in at least one world (of the
multiverse), which has a chance of 100%, and as PP states, and Squires,
Tegmark and other infer, Hugh should be certain that the proposition is
true. This, of course, does not mean that Hugh should think that the
fermion spin could not be in the eigenstate |↓〉, but this is another proposi-
tion, different from A; we shall consider this fine point below.
If the case (ii) is correct, then Hugh is substituted for some other indi-
vidual(s), say Hugh1 in the branch in which the spin is ”up”, and Hugh2
in the branch where the spin is ”down”. (This is, parenthetically, a nice
illustration of the Tappenden’s concept of distinction along the superslice
dimension. On the other hand, this case is antithetical to the entire idea of
the quantum suicide experiment, and is considered here just for the sake of
completeness.) However, now the proposition A above is obviously wrong,
since Hugh 6= Hugh1 and Hugh 6= Hugh2. Thus the chance of proposition A
being true is zero and, as PP states, Hugh should be certain that he would
not survive.
Finally, we have the case (iii), where we suppose that Hugh exists in
the wavefunction branch in which the gun clicks. In the other one, presum-
ably, he is replaced with (dead) individual Hugh1. Now, the chance of the
proposition A is just the quantum-mechanical probability 50%, and, as PP
says, Hugh should have credence 50% in this proposition. Note that this
5Tappenden (2000), pp. 106-107.
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case is completely analogous to the case of quantum suicide in the collapse
quantum theories.
We conclude that PP remains entirely valid. Now, why is this so counter-
intuitive? The answer is that we have confused the proposition A above with
the different proposition, say B, stating that
B: The result of spin measurement is the eigenstate |↑〉.
In contrast to A, the proposition B obviously does not depend on the
issue of personal identity; it is completely objective statement about physical
system. However, it also can be understood in various ways, depending on
the sort of quantum theory we accept. In the no-collapse theories considered
here, we may understand B to mean that the result of measurement will be
spin “up” in at least one world. This obviously has the chance of 100%, and
agrees well with the outcome of our analysis of the case (i) above for the
proposition A. Now, if we define the entire quantum suicide experimental
setup as B ⇒ A, there is no contradiction. Problems may arise when we
interpret B as the statement that the spin is “up” in this particular branch
of the universal wavefunction. Obviously such proposition has chance of
50%, but on the level of subjective probabilities, this corresponds not to
Hugh, but to his laboratory assistant.
3 Discussion
The difference between internal and external viewpoints regarding the re-
lationship between observers and the quantum description (cf. Tegmark
1998) becomes starkly clear when compared to a similar apparent quantum-
mechanical PP violation, now in the context of the ”collapse” theories.
Bostrom (2001) describes a ”Quantum Joe” thought experiment in which
it is explicitly stipulated that ”no-collapse” theories are false, and that the
wavefunction collapse is real and stochastic (as in the orthodox Copenhagen
form of quantum mechanics):
Quantum Joe
Joe, the amateur scientist, has discovered that he is alone in
the cosmos so far. He builds a quantum device which according
to quantum physics has a one-in-ten chance of outputting any
single-digit integer. He also builds a reproduction device which
when activated will create ten thousand clones of Joe. He then
hooks up the two so that the reproductive device will kick into
action unless the quantum device outputs a zero; but if the out-
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put is a zero, then the reproductive machine will be destroyed.
There are not enough materials left for Joe to reproduce in some
other way, so he will then have been the only observer... Using
the same kinds of argument as before, we can show that Joe
should expect that a zero come up, even though the objective
(physical) chance is a mere 10%.
Here we also perceive the apparent violation of PP, due to probabilis-
tic expectations following the so-called Self-Sampling Assumption (i.e. the
assumption that every observer should reason as if they were a random
sample drawn from the set of all observers). The violation is only appar-
ent, since it is based on indexical information about Joe’s position in the
human species, which is deemed inadmissible. In contradistinction to the
Quantum Joe thought experiment, in the Quantum Hugh case the truth of
”no-collapse” quantum mechanics is explicitly stipulated. Note that if some
of the “collapse” theories, say the orthodox one or the one of Ghirardi, Ri-
mini and Weber (1986), is correct description of reality, the validity of PP
is straightforward and obvious. On the other hand, both sorts of apparent
conflict, the one in the quantum suicide and the one in the Quantum Joe
experiment, are not at all obvious, and ultimately depend on considerations
related to the properties of intelligent observers themselves. It is interesting
to speculate whether there are other sorts of ”anthropic” evidence in differ-
ent physical setups, but this goes beyond the scope of the present study.
We conclude that even in the case of Everett’s (or any other ”no-
collapse”) theory being the correct description of reality, we can—with our
experimenter—coherently believe in equating subjective credence with ob-
jective chance in quantum-mechanical experiments. This is true provided
our insight in the nature of experiment, definition of relevant concepts in
the multiverse settings of the ”no-collapse” theories, and relevant capacities
of the experimenter is deep enough. We can then, in general, retain both
PP and the ”no-collapse” theories.
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